Francisco Poggi

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Northwestern Economics

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Citizenship: Argentina and Italy

Fields

Research: Microeconomic Theory, Innovation, Law and Economics
Teaching: Microeconomics, Statistics.

Education

Ph.D., Economics, Northwestern University — (anticipated) 2021
  Dissertation: Essays on Learning and Markets.
  Committee: Jeffrey Ely (Chair), Bruno Strulovici, Wojciech Olszewski

M.A., Economics, Universidad de San Andrés — 2013

B.A., Economics, Universidad de San Andrés — 2012

Fellowships & Awards

Dissertation University Fellowship, Northwestern University — 2020–2021
Young Researcher Award, Argentine Association of Economists — 2014
Merit Scolarship, Universidad de San Andrés — 2013
Mathematical Olympiad Scholarship, Universidad de San Andrés — 2009-2011

Teaching Experience

Teaching Assistant, Northwestern University — 2016-2019
  Microeconomics (Graduate)
  Behavioral Economics (Undergraduate)
  Intermediate Microeconomics (Undergraduate)

Teaching Assistant, Kellogg School of Management — 2018-2020
  Decision Making and Modeling (MBA)
  Analytical Approach to Uncertainty (EMBA)
  Statistical Decision Analysis (EMBA)
  Biases, Forecast, and Deep Uncertainty (EMBA)

Teaching Assistant, Universidad de San Andrés — 2013-2015
  Advanced Microeconomics (Graduate)
  Intermediate Microeconomics (Undergraduate)

Lecturer, Universidad de Buenos Aires — 2013-2015
  Economics and Public Finance (Graduate, Law School)

Research Experience

Research Assistant, Eddie Dekel, Northwestern University — 2020
Research Assistant, Jeffrey Ely, Northwestern University — 2019
Research Assistant, Bruno Strulovici, Northwestern University — 2019
Research Assistant, Federico Weinschelbaum, Universidad de San Andrés — 2013-2014

Refereeing

American Economic Review, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

Job Market Paper

"The Timing of Complementary Innovations"

Abstract: This paper studies the development of technologies that require complementary innovations. At each point in time, resources are allocated to research projects that are completed stochastically in the form of breakthroughs. I solve the problem of efficient dynamic allocation of resources by showing that, for complements, this problem is equivalent to an auxiliary static problem. In some cases, the solution involves developing the innovations in sequence. In others, it is optimal to develop multiple innovations simultaneously. I provide a simple condition that determines the efficient timing of development. Then, I compare the solution to a decentralized allocation that is the equilibrium outcome when a continuum of firms race to innovate. The decentralized allocation is efficient if the projects are symmetric or the stakes are sufficiently high, provided that the innovators are compensated for the increase in value of subsequent innovations.

Other papers

"Liability Design with Information Acquisition" with Bruno Strulovici

Brief abstract: How to guarantee that firms perform due diligence before launching potentially dangerous products? We study the design of liability rules when (i) limited liability prevents firms from internalizing the full damage they may cause, (ii) penalties are paid only if damage occurs, regardless of the product's inherent riskiness, (iii) firms have private information about their products' riskiness before performing due diligence. We show that (i) any liability mechanism can be implemented by a *tariff* that depends only on the evidence acquired by the firm if a damage occurs, not on any initial report by the firm about its private information, (ii) firms that assign a higher prior to product riskiness always perform more due diligence but less than is socially optimal, and (iii) under a simple and intuitive condition, any type-specific launch thresholds can be implemented by a monotonic tariff.

"Market-Based Mechanisms" with Quitzé Valenzuela-Stookey

Brief abstract: Decision makers frequently condition their actions on economic outcomes that they believe convey information about an unknown state. However the decision maker's action, or expectations thereof, may also influence the outcome. We study the general problem of choosing decision rules mapping outcomes to actions in the presence of such feedback effects. We characterize the set of joint distributions of outcomes, actions, and states that can be implemented as the unique equilibrium by decision rules which satisfy a minimal notion of robustness to manipulation. Moreover, we show that all such equilibria are robust to model misspecification.

"A Taxation Principle with Non-Contractible Events" with Bruno Strulovici

Brief abstract: In some settings it is not possible to contract with an agent ex ante. We study a principal-agent model with private information and moral hazard in which the intervention of the principal is only triggered by certain outcomes. We introduce a property of social choice functions, *identifiability* and show that implementable social choice functions satisfying this property can be implemented by a *tariff*.

Work in Progress

"Delayed Disclosure" with Ludvig Sinander

"Optimal Publication Bias"

Languages

English (fluent), Spanish (native), Italian (basic)

References

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