Welcome!
I am a microeconomic theorist exploring how incentives to acquire, elicit, disclose, and conceal information shape economic interactions. I am interested in innovation, law, and industrial organization.
I joined the University of Mannheim as an Assistant Professor (W1) after graduating from Northwestern University (2021).
Research:
Strategic Concelament in Innovation Races. with Yonggyun Kim
- Firms might avoid patenting intermediate innovations, even when this would mean capturing the full social value of the innovation.
Market-based Mechanisms.
with Quitzé Valenzuela-Stookey
R&R at the Journal of Political Economy.
- How can policies use information contained in market outcomes when market participants care about the policy itself?
A Taxation Principle with Non-Contractible Events. with Bruno Strulovici
- Sometimes, eliciting private information becomes redundant.
The Timing of Complementary Innovations.
- Breakthroughs always enhance incentives to work on complementary projects, but only when the timing is endogenous.
Liability Design with Information Acquisition. with Bruno Strulovici
- How should liability be determined for an agent who acquires information about an unknown risk?