I am a microeconomic theorist. My research focuses on the incentives to acquire, elicit, disclose, and conceal information. I am interested in industrial organization, law, and innovation.
I work at the University of Mannheim - Department of Economics as an Assistant Professor (W1) and received my Ph.D. from Northwestern University (2021).
Market-Based Mechanisms (with Quitzé Valenzuela-Stookey )
We study the problem of a principal who conditions their actions on the outcomes of a competitive market as a proxy for an unobserved payoff-relevant state. Agents in the market have private information about the state, and their choices reflect both their beliefs about the state and their expectations of the principal's actions. This introduces two-way feedback between policy and the market. In a general setting, we characterize the set of joint distributions of market outcomes, principal actions, and states that can be implemented in equilibrium by a principal with commitment power. We focus in particular on implementation under constraints imposed by concerns about manipulation and equilibrium multiplicity. Our characterization of the implementable set admits a tractable representation, and significantly simplifies the principal's design problem. We apply our results to study bailout policies.
I'm co-organizing the 2023 annual conference of the Competition Law and Economics European Network (CLEEN).
The Mannheim Centre for Competition and Innovation (MaCCI), the Collaborative Research Center Transregio 224 EPoS at the universities of Bonn and Mannheim, and ZEW Mannheim are pleased to announce the 2023 annual conference of the Competition Law and Economics European Network (CLEEN).
CLEEN has provided an interdisciplinary platform for researchers in the field of law and economics since its first research workshop in Bonn in 2007. According to current planning, the 2023 CLEEN Conference will be held in person in Mannheim.
Strategic Concealment in Innovation Races (with Yonggyun Kim )
We investigate a firm's incentives to conceal an intermediate research discovery in order to influence its rival's choice of strategy in an innovation race. To study this, we introduce an innovation game where two firms dynamically allocate their resources between two distinct research and development (R&D) paths towards a final innovation: (i) developing it with the currently available but slower technology; (ii) conducting research to discover a faster new technology for developing it. We fully characterize the equilibrium behavior of the firms in the cases where their research progress is public and private information. Then, we extend the private information setting by allowing firms to conceal or license their intermediate discoveries. We show that when the reward of winning the race is high, firms sometimes conceal their interim discoveries, which inefficiently retards the pace of innovation.